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Background: This study determined current status of laboratory biosafety in Nigerian veterinary research
facilities.
Methods: A questionnaire was developed to obtain information from researchers across Nigeria from July
2014 to July 2015. Information regarding demographics, knowledge of laboratory biosafety, availability
and proper use of personal protective equipment (PPE), any priority pathogens researched, attitude on
and use of standard laboratory practices, and biosafety awareness was obtained using a numeric scoring
system. Data were analyzed with descriptive statistics, and univariate and multivariate logistic
regression.
Results: A total of 74 participants from 19 facilities completed the questionnaire. General knowledge
scores ranged from 3 to 28 (out of 28 possible points), with 94.6% of respondents receiving low scores
(scores < mean þ 1 standard deviation). Very few (17.6%) reported availability or use PPE. Many par-
ticipants (63.5%) reported no access to biosafety level (BSL)-1e3 facilities. None reported availability of a
BSL-4 facility. Knowledge scores pertaining to biosafety management practices ranged from 0 to 14 (out
of 14 possible points) with 47.3% of respondents receiving good scores (scores > mean þ 1 standard
deviation). Only 16.2% of respondents (from four facilities) reported having biosafety ofﬁcers. Rabies
virus was the most researched pathogen (31.1% of respondents). The majority (71.6%) were unaware of
laws guiding biosafety. Researchers [odds ratio (OR) ¼ 18.0; 95% conﬁdence interval (CI): 1.63, 198.5;
p ¼ 0.023], especially in BSL-2 (OR ¼ 258.5; 95% CI: 12.71, 5256; p < 0.001) facility of research institute
(OR ¼ 25.0; 95% CI: 5.18, 120.6; p < 0.001), are more likely to have adequate access to and properly utilize
biosafety devices and PPE.
Conclusions: Current knowledge of laboratory biosafety is limited except among a few researchers.
 2016, Occupational Safety and Health Research Institute. Published by Elsevier. This is an open access
article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Biosafety is a discipline that focuses on the safe handling and
containment of infectious microorganisms and hazardous biological
materials. Recently, research on infectious pathogens has been on
the rise due to the emergence of new and re-emergence of previ-
ously identiﬁed infectious agents and diseases, some of which couldPublic Health and Preventive Medi
mail23us@gmail.com (I.A. Odetoku
afety and Health Research Institute
IA, et al., Status of Laboratory
.doi.org/10.1016/j.shaw.2016.0be used as weapons of bioterrorism [1e3]. Laboratory researchers,
including those working in veterinary facilities, are at risk of being
exposed to infectious zoonotic agents. Zoonoses account for up to
61% of all contagious diseases affecting humans worldwide and also
make up 75% of emerging human diseases [4]. Most infectious and
zoonotic diseases usually start as anthroponosesdtransmitted from
lower vertebrates (primary sources) to humans. Anthroponoses,cine, Faculty of Veterinary Medicine, P.M.B. 1515, University of Ilorin, Ilorin, Nigeria.
n).
. Published by Elsevier. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
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Saf Health Work 2016;-:1e102such as those involving the highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza vi-
ruses, Lassa fever virus, Brucella spp., pathogenic Mycobacterium
spp., Bacillus anthracis, Escherichia coli O157:H7, Salmonella spp., and
rabies virus [5e12], typically cause serious health hazards among
vast animal populations worldwide with the attendant economic
and public health consequences being enormous [13]. The majority
of these pathogens are on the Centers for Disease Control and Pre-
vention (CDC) bioterrorism agents list [14].
Growing attention is being given to laboratory biosafety and
containment of infectious agents [15] as most diseases caused by
zoonotic agents are well-known and preventable. Laboratory
biosafety and biosecurity are important in order to ensure re-
searchers’ safety, especially from laboratory acquired infections
(LAIs), and to protect the public from accidental or intentional
exposure to infectious pathogens [16]. These risks have raised a
serious concern for the training of laboratory researchers [17].
Despite extensive documentation of the occurrence of LAIs
causing disease and mortality among researchers [18] these in-
fections still remain a problem. Due to scarce reports on LAIs in
Nigerian veterinary research facilities, the magnitude of this
problem remains largely unknown, thus hindering the ability to
determine the best course of action to control the occurrence
of LAIs.
Previous studies have focused on laboratory biosafety and bio-
security as it relates to laboratory technicians [19,20], clinical
microbiology laboratories [20e22] medical diagnostic laboratories
[23,24], and pharmaceutical and biotechnology laboratories [23]
that work with human pathogens. Detailed studies on laboratory
biosafety and biosecurity in Africa are uncommon [23,25]. In
Nigeria, no study to date has assessed the state of biosafety and
biosecurity in the few available veterinary research facilities.
Despite reported outbreaks of highly infectious zoonotic pathogens
[26e28] current information on the laboratory biosafety capabil-
ities of existing veterinary research facilities working with these
pathogens is unavailable. In this study, we surveyed researchers’
knowledge of laboratory biosafety, the availability and proper use
of biosafety equipment, the name and category of hazardous
pathogens being studied, personal attitudes on and use of standard
laboratory practices, and the level of biosafety awareness in vet-
erinary facilities across Nigeria.
2. Materials and methods
2.1. Study design
A cross-sectional biosafety survey was carried out from July
2014 to July 2015. The target population included graduate stu-
dents, academics, laboratory technologists, research ofﬁcers, and
veterinary clinicians working in veterinary research facilities
across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. The sample size for-
mula (n ¼ Z2 p (1 e p) / d2) for ﬁeld study according to Thrusﬁeld
[29], where n is the computed sample size, Z is the degree of
conﬁdence (1.96 in this study), p is the expected proportion, and
d is the desired absolute precision at the 95% conﬁdence level (10%
in this study), was used to obtain the target sample size. For this
study, as we had no prior data regarding the proportion of re-
searchers in veterinary facilities having a good laboratory knowl-
edge score (deﬁned as greater than one standard deviation above
the mean), therefore, we set p at 50%. This gave a minimum sample
size (n) of 96 respondents. To increase precision, 160 question-
naires were administered to respondents through a snowballing
technique. This technique is a chain referral process in which re-
spondents in veterinary facilities from the six geopolitical zones
were asked to recommend other researchers until the desired
sample size is met.Please cite this article in press as: Odetokun IA, et al., Status of Laboratory
Safety and Health at Work (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shaw.2016.02.2. Questionnaire design and implementation
The questionnaire was comprised of two parts: demographic
questions and general biosafety and biosecurity questions. Ques-
tions raised in our questionnaire were based on standards stipu-
lated in international laboratory biosafety manuals such as the
Biosafety in Microbiological and Biomedical Laboratories (BMBL)
5th Edition and the Laboratory Biosafety Manual (3rd Edition)
developed by the World Health Organization (2014). In this study,
questions indicative of respondents’ general knowledge of labo-
ratory biosafety, including issues such as biosecurity, biocontain-
ment, decontamination protocols, biosafety levels and cabinets,
standard operating procedures (SOPs), personal protective
equipment (PPE), biohazard transport and disposal, and pest
control, were asked. Also, respondents were asked about the
availability and use of biosafety devices (such as facilities with the
appropriate biosafety level and biosafety cabinets) and PPE. On
PPE, we asked the respondents to list up to ﬁve of the basic PPE
(such as lab coat, hand gloves, nose mask, hair net, face mask/
safety goggles) they use when working with pathogens. If a
respondent lists three to ﬁve PPE correctly, this is scored as good
usage/availability. A list of two or fewer PPE is scored as poor us-
age/availability.
Respondents were further asked about their awareness of
national laws regulating biosafety and select agents, as well as
biosafety and biosecurity-related terms and regulatory associa-
tions both in Nigeria and globally. The questionnaire was pre-
tested on ﬁve veterinary researchers from two veterinary
faculties in the southwest and northcentral geopolitical regions of
Nigeria.
The questionnaires were purposively administered to lec-
turers and laboratory technologists (irrespective of rank) car-
rying out research in Nigerian universities and colleges with
veterinary faculties or units, veterinary research ofﬁcers and
technologists in various research laboratories at the National
Veterinary Research Institute, veterinary clinicians with their
own laboratories, and graduate students performing research in
these facilities. Graduate students were typically enrolled in a
PhD or Master’s veterinary program and had at least 1 year’s
experience of conducting research in a veterinary research fa-
cility. Participating laboratories/respondents were purposively
sampled based on their availability, veterinary research activity
and/or presence of a veterinary research facility/laboratory.
Consent was given by all participants and by the appropriate
administrative personnel for all facilities where the question-
naire was distributed. Respondents were allowed to withdraw
from the survey without penalty at any time. All supplied in-
formation was maintained conﬁdential by the personnel
administering the questionnaire and tabulating the results. The
six Nigerian geopolitical zones from which researchers were
enlisted were the northwest, northeast, northcentral, southwest,
southeast, and south-south.
2.3. Data management and statistical analysis
Datawere summarized usingMicrosoft Excel 2013 and analyzed
using Open Source Epidemiologic Statistics for Public Health
(OpenEpi), version 3.03a (http://www.openepi.com/Menu/OE_
Menu.htm, updated 2015/05/04). A dependent/outcome variable
was created for the following speciﬁc objectives that were used to
determine the status of biosafety and biosecurity in Nigerian vet-
erinary research facilities: (1) general knowledge of laboratory
biosafety and biosecurity; (2) availability and proper use of
biosafety devices and PPE; (3) management knowledge of biolog-
ical safety; (4) breakdown of laboratory biosecurity; (5) attitudeBiosafety and Biosecurity in Veterinary Research Facilities in Nigeria,
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Table 2
Demographic distribution of Nigerian students and researchers in veterinary
research laboratories participating in a survey in 2014e2015
n (%)
Age (y)
20e39 57 (77.0)
40e59 16 (21.6)
 60 1 (1.4)
Sex
Male 54 (73.0)
Female 20 (27.0)
Occupation
Student 13 (17.6)
Academic 26 (35.1)
Laboratory technologist 14 (18.9)
Researcher 10 (13.5)
Veterinary clinician 11 (14.9)
Facility type
University/college laboratory 54 (73.0)
Research institute laboratory 12 (16.2)
Veterinary clinic laboratory 8 (10.8)
Biosafety level
None 47 (63.5)
1 10 (13.5)
2 15 (20.3)
3 2 (2.7)
4 0 (0.0)
Years of service (y)
1e5 39 (52.7)
6e10 25 (33.8)
11e15 8 (10.8)
I.A. Odetokun et al / Veterinary Biosafety and Biosecurity in Nigeria 3and adherence to standard laboratory practices; and (6) biosafety
awareness level among researchers. Ranking of priority pathogens
according to risk group and select agent status was done according
to the United States Department of Agriculture and CDC criteria
(available on the American Biological Safety Association website:
https://my.absa.org/tiki-index.php?page¼Riskgroups). Pathogens
such as Salmonella spp. were observed to be categorized into two
risk groups (2 and 3). The higher risk group levels were used in our
analyses since the Salmonella spp. classiﬁed as risk group 3 path-
ogens were of animal origin.
A numeric scoring system was developed to assess general
biosafety knowledge, the proper use of biosafety devices and PPE,
the attitude of researchers and their adherence to standard labo-
ratory practices, and the level of biosafety awareness. Cut-off points
for good/high/satisfactory scores were deﬁned as scores greater
thanmeanþ 1 standard deviation of the scores exceptwhere stated
otherwise (Table 1). Descriptive and inferential statistics were then
performed on the data. Chi-square analysis was used to test the
association between demographic factors and outcome variables at
the 95% conﬁdence interval. Only variables displaying a signiﬁcant
association (p < 0.05 using the Fisher exact test) were subjected to
likelihood multivariate logistic regression analysis to determine
possible predicting factors (controlling for other covariates) for the
status of biosafety and biosecurity in veterinary research facilities
in Nigeria.16e20 2 (2.7)
Region in Nigeria
Northwest 18 (24.3)
Northeast 8 (10.8)
Northcentral 21 (28.4)
Southwest 15 (20.3)
Southeast 7 (9.5)
South-south 5 (6.8)3. Results
3.1. Response rate
Of the 160 questionnaires distributed, 74 were retrieved from
researchers, yielding a response rate of 46.5%.3.2. Demographic information
The demographic information for the respondents is presented
in Table 2. Respondents were predominantlymale (77.0%) and had a
mean age of 35.7  6.9 years. Only a single respondent was older
than 60 years. Respondents’ occupations include all the three
occupational categories from 19 different facilities across the
country, although those working as academics (university or col-
lege) composed the greatest proportion (35.1%). The majority of
respondents (68.9%) had < 10 years of experience in veterinary
research facilities. Of the 74 participants in the survey, 73.1% re-
ported that they conduct research in university or college labora-
tories. Respondents from all six geopolitical zones in Nigeria were
represented, although most were from northcentral (28.4%),
northwest (24.3%), and southwest (20.3%) regions.Table 1
Description of scores obtainable by respondents (outcomes)
Minimum obtainab
General knowledge of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity 3
Availability and proper use of biosafety devices and
personal protective equipment
0
Management knowledge of biological safety 0
Breakdown of laboratory biosecurityz 0
Attitude and adherence to standard laboratory practices 0
Biosafety awareness level among researchers 0
* Good/Satisfactory scores ¼ scores > mean þ 1 standard deviation.
y Occurrence of biosecurity breakdown ¼ scores > mean.
z Respondents were asked to indicate and explain if they have experienced any biosecu
not.
Please cite this article in press as: Odetokun IA, et al., Status of Laboratory
Safety and Health at Work (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shaw.2016.03.3. General knowledge of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity
General knowledge scores ranged from 3 to 28 points (out of a
possible score of 28 points). These scores were normally distributed
with a mean of 19.1  6.4 (Table 1). A majority (94.6%) of the re-
spondents had poor general knowledge scores (Table 3).
3.4. Availability and proper use of biosafety devices and personal
protective equipment
Less than one-ﬁfth (17.6%) of the respondents reported that
these devices were readily available and used appropriately
(Table 3). Most of the respondents (79.7%) reported the use of PPE,
although many (63.5%) had no access to facilities of any biosafety
level; 13.5% used BSL-1, 20.3% used BSL-2, and only 2.7% (two re-
spondents) used BSL-3 facilities. No respondent reported thele score Maximum obtainable score Mean  standard deviation
28 19.10  6.38*
13 5.38  3.53*
14 3.84  3.54*
2 1.60  0.59y
15 7.42  3.76*
10 2.88  2.70*
rity issues in their facilities. Issues explained were veriﬁed and scored to be correct or
Biosafety and Biosecurity in Veterinary Research Facilities in Nigeria,
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Table 3
Status of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in veterinary research facilities
(parameters scored as a percentage)
n (%)
General knowledge of laboratory biosafety and biosecurity
Satisfactory knowledge 4 (5.4)
Poor knowledge 70 (94.6)
Availability and proper use of biosafety devices and
personal protective equipment
Good usage/availability 13 (17.6)
Poor usage/availability 61 (82.4)
Management knowledge of biological safety
Satisfactory knowledge 35 (47.3)
Poor knowledge 39 (52.7)
Breakdown of laboratory biosecurity
Had not occurred 55 (74.3)
Had occurred 19 (25.7)
Attitude and adherence to standard laboratory practices
Good 22 (29.7)
Poor 52 (70.3)
Biosafety awareness level among researchers
High 19 (25.7)
Low 55 (74.3)
Table 4
Classiﬁcation of laboratory biosafety levels (BSL) of veterinary research facilities in
Nigeria
Facility type n (19) BSL
None 1 2 3 4
University/college laboratory 11 U U U  
Research institute laboratory 1 U U U U 
Veterinary clinic laboratory 7 U    
U, present; , absent.
Saf Health Work 2016;-:1e104availability of a BSL-4 facility (Table 4). Frequent nonusage of
biosafety cabinets (BSCs) for research was reported (67.6%), while
9.5%, 21.6%, and 1.4% of respondents reported the availability and
usage of BSC-1, BSC-2, and BSC-3 equipment, respectively.
3.5. Management knowledge of biological safety in veterinary
research facilities
Knowledge scores pertaining to management practices ranged
from 0 to 14, out of 14 possible points (Table 1), and were positively
skewed (median ¼ 3.00). Nearly half of the respondents (47.3%)
received satisfactory scores (scores>meanþ 1 standard deviation;
Table 3). Of the 74 respondents, less than half (41.9%) had under-
gone training in laboratory biosafety, 44.6% had laboratory decon-
tamination protocols in place, 47.3% had SOPs in use in their
laboratories, 18.9% had their SOPs updated yearly, 39.2% had pest
control procedures in place, 21.6% kept records of LAIs, 16.2% had
records of the health history of research staff, 36.5% had received
immunizations against potential agents of LAIs, 33.8% had occu-
pational health and emergency response plans in place, 16.2% (from
only four of the 19 facilities surveyed) had biosafety ofﬁcers, and
14.9% had their laboratories accredited within the previous 3 years.
3.6. Priority pathogens categorized according to risk groups
Of the 74 respondents, more than two-thirds (73.0%) reported
that they were more likely to be exposed to hazards from infectious
pathogens than from chemicals in their veterinary research facil-
ities. The largest proportion of respondents (33.8%) reported
working with rodents; other respondents reported working with
ruminants (cattle, sheep, and goats; 17.6%), small animals (dogs and
cats; 13.5%), nonhuman primates (5.4%), poultry (4.1%), ﬁsh (2.7%),Please cite this article in press as: Odetokun IA, et al., Status of Laboratory
Safety and Health at Work (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shaw.2016.0camels (2.7%), pigs (1.4%), rabbits (1.4%), and wildlife (1.4%). Some
respondents (16.2%) did not report working with animals. A small
number of respondents (n ¼ 8 or 10.8%) reported working with
highly infectious viral pathogens in risk group 4, including peste
de petits ruminants virus (3 respondents, or 4.05%), Lassa fever
virus (3 respondents, or 4.05%), and African swine fever virus
(2 respondents, or 2.70%).
A larger proportion of survey respondents reported working
with agents classiﬁed as risk group 3 pathogens (Fig. 1). The four
most reported group 3 pathogens were rabies virus (23 re-
spondents, 31.08%), Brucella spp. (19 respondents, 25.68%), Salmo-
nella spp. (animal strains: 17 respondents, 22.97%), and pathogenic
Mycobacterium spp. (15 respondents, 20.27%). Two respondents
(2.70%) reported working with Yersinia pestis, and a single
respondent (1.35%) reported working with the fungal pathogen
Histoplasma spp.
The three most reported risk group 2 pathogens (Fig. 2) in this
survey were Staphylococcus spp., including methicillin-resistant
Staphylococcus aureus (14 respondents, or 18.94%), E. coli (13 re-
spondents, 17.57%), and highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza virus (13
respondents, 17.57%).
According to the United States Department of Agriculture and
CDC criteria, eleven of the pathogens reported in this survey,
researched in Nigerian veterinary facilities, are categorized as select
agents (Fig. 3). These select agents are Brucella spp., B. anthracis,
Clostridium spp., Lassa fevervirus,Mycoplasmamycoides, andY. pestis.
3.7. Breakdown of laboratory biosecurity
Approximately three-quarters of respondents (74.3%) reported
no occurrence of breakdown, or failure of laboratory biosafety
(Table 3). Of the respondents who reported the occurrence of
biosafety breakdown, 70.0% cited the presence of laboratory bio-
hazards associated with pathogenic agents.
3.8. Attitude and adherence to standard laboratory practices
Slightly more than one-quarter of the respondents (29.7%) re-
ported a good attitude relating to standard laboratory practices
(Table 3). The majority of respondents (68.9%) reported decon-
taminating or removing PPE upon exit from the research facility.
Fewer respondents (21.6%) reported showering when exiting areas
of the laboratory containing infectious material. Only 39.2% re-
ported decontaminating equipment before removal from the
research facility. Approximately half of the respondents (54.1%)
reported autoclaving laboratory biowaste. A similar proportion
(52.7%) were unaware of how biohazardous waste is transported
for disposal, although 32.4% and 14.9% of respondents, respectively,
reported the use of dedicated vehicles and/or vendors and wheel-
barrows for disposal of waste. Half of the respondents (50.0%) re-
ported incinerating biohazardous waste, while 31.1% reported
disposing biohazardous waste in the general waste dumps.
3.9. Biosafety awareness among researchers
Overall, the biosafety awareness level is low. The percentage of
respondents having low awareness level is 74.3% (Table 3). The
majority of the respondents (71.6%) were unaware of national laws
guiding biosafety and biosecurity in Nigeria. Few respondents re-
ported being aware of the Cartagena protocol on biosafety (14.9%)
and select agents (24.3%). More than half of the respondents (56.8%
and 52.7%, respectively) reported being mindful of the BMBL and
the Institutional Animal Care and Use Committee (IACUC) regula-
tions. Respondents’ awareness of the Nigerian Biological Safety
Association (NiBSA; 21.6%), African Biological Safety AssociationBiosafety and Biosecurity in Veterinary Research Facilities in Nigeria,
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Fig. 1. Risk group 3 pathogens.
AHSV, African horse sickness virus; IBDV, Infectious Bursal Disease Virus.
Fig. 2. Risk group 2 pathogens.
HPAI, Highly pathogenic avian inﬂuenza; NCDV, Newcastle disease virus.
I.A. Odetokun et al / Veterinary Biosafety and Biosecurity in Nigeria 5(AfBSA; 16.2%), International Federation of Biosafety Associations
(IFBA; 23.0%), and International Veterinary Biosafety Workgroup
(IVBW; 27.0%) was low.
3.10. Factors associated with the status of biosafety and biosecurity
in veterinary research facilities in Nigeria
Multivariate logistic regression analysis (Tables 5e8) revealed
factors associated with the status of biosafety and biosecurity in
veterinary research facilities in Nigeria. Men [odds ratio (OR)¼ 5.39;
95% conﬁdence interval (CI): 1.59, 18.28; p ¼ 0.008] are ﬁve times
more likely to possess satisfactory management knowledge of
biosafety (Table 5). In the occupation category (Table 6), researchers
(OR¼ 18.0; 95% CI: 1.63, 198.5; p¼ 0.023) are far more likely to have
adequate access to and properly utilize biosafety devices and PPE.Please cite this article in press as: Odetokun IA, et al., Status of Laboratory
Safety and Health at Work (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shaw.2016.0However, veterinary clinicians are far more likely to experience
breakdown of laboratory biosecurity (OR ¼ 15.13; 95% CI: 2.28,
100.3; p ¼ 0.006) despite having a high likelihood of biosafety
awareness (OR ¼ 9.63; 95% CI: 1.38, 67.24; p ¼ 0.043). Respondents
working in BSL-2 facilities (Table 7) are more likely have good usage
(OR ¼ 258.5; 95% CI: 12.71, 5256; p < 0.001) of the facility, satis-
factory management knowledge of biosafety (OR ¼ 36.62; 95% CI:
4.37, 307.2; p < 0.001) and good attitude and adherence to standard
laboratory practices (OR ¼ 6.33; 95% CI: 1.79, 22.39; p ¼ 0.008).
Research institute (Table 8) as a facility type has a high likelihood of
being associated with good usage and availability of biosafety de-
vices and PPE (OR¼ 25.0; 95% CI: 5.18,120.6; p< 0.001), satisfactory
management of biosafety (OR ¼ 16.0; 95% CI: 1.925, 133; p ¼ 0.003),
and good attitude and adherence to standard laboratory practices
(OR ¼ 7.0; 95% CI: 1.79, 27.3; p ¼ 0.009).Biosafety and Biosecurity in Veterinary Research Facilities in Nigeria,
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Fig. 3. Select agents according to USDA/CDC criteria.
AHSV, African horse sickness virus; ASFV, African swine fever virus; FMDV, Foot and mouth disease virus; NCDV, Newcastle disease virus; PPRV, Peste de petits ruminants virus.
Table 5
Likelihood multivariate logistic regression analysis of sex as a factor associated with
the status of biosafety and biosecurity in veterinary research facilities in Nigeria
OR 95% CI p
Management knowledge
of biosafety
Sex Poor
knowledge (%)
Satisfactory
knowledge (%)
Female 16 (21.6) 4 (5.4) 1.00
Male 23 (31.1) 31 (41.9) 5.39 1.59, 18.28 0.008*
* Signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
CI, conﬁdence interval; OR, odds ratio.
Saf Health Work 2016;-:1e1064. Discussion
This study revealed the level of negligence of laboratorybiosafety
and biosecurity in Nigerian veterinary laboratory facilities. We
found that the majority of researchers have poor laboratory
biosafety general knowledge scores, few report acceptable usage of
biosafetydevices andPPE, andmany lackaccess toBSL-1e4 facilities,
including BSCs. Also, despite the absence of BSL facilities, re-
searchers continue to work with pathogens at all risk levels (1e4)
including select agents, with rabies virus being themost researched
high-risk pathogen nationwide. The overall awareness level of re-
searchers regarding national and international laws and bodies
pertaining to laboratory biosafety is low.We also found that certain
occupations and facility types are predictors of good laboratory
biosafety scores. To our knowledge, this survey is the ﬁrst in Nigeria
to evaluate the state of laboratory biosafety in veterinary facilities.
Although the survey response rate of 46.5% is reasonable, not having
a higher response rate may be due to inadequate motivation on the
part of the respondents,which could also be indicative of the level of
attention attached to laboratory biosafety. Poor knowledge scores
received by the respondents signify a severe deﬁcit in laboratory
biosafety training and emphasize the urgent need to address this
shortfall in the face of emerging and re-emerging zoonoses.
Biosafety and biosecurity are compromised primarily in low-
resource nations such as Nigeria [30]. In a survey of laboratory
biosafety in India, Goswami et al [31] discovered that paramedical
staff display a high level of biosafety knowledge. In addition to
biosafety, biosecurity is also poorly implemented in Nigerian
research facilities, which could create risks for researchers con-
tracting LAIs. In any event of a breakdown in laboratory biosecurity,Please cite this article in press as: Odetokun IA, et al., Status of Laboratory
Safety and Health at Work (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shaw.2016.0the public too are at possible risk of contracting infectious diseases.
The proper use of containment devices, biosafety level facilities, and
PPE are essential in preventing occupational infections [3].
Despite the majority of respondents reporting the use of PPE,
there is often a lack of access to biosafety facilities and biosafety
cabinets in veterinary facilities. As a result, those working on
pathogens in risk groups 3 and 4 (especially rabies virus, Brucella
spp., B. anthracis, Mycobacterium spp., Y. pestis, Lassa fever virus,
and African swine fever virus), including several select agents,
could be predisposed to contracting LAIs. Our ﬁndings are similar to
those in a study by Oladeinde et al [24], which reported that most
public and private human diagnostic laboratories in Nigeria lack
biosafety cabinets. Whatever the setting, any lapse in laboratory
biosecurity could seriously undermine public safety.
Management and administrative control of biological safety are
integral parts of an effective biosafety program [30]. That less than
half of respondents received satisfactory scores in the category of
laboratory biosafety management provides additional evidence of
poor biosafety and biosecurity knowledge in veterinary facilities in
Nigeria. It is noteworthy that some researchers had completed
laboratory biosafety training, and some laboratories had estab-
lished decontamination protocols and SOPs, despite poor updating
of SOPs. Gaudioso et al [32] found that biosafety training is routine
in the US bioscience community. The importance of training lab-
oratory researchers in biosafety and biosecurity [30] was empha-
sized in studies conducted by Goswami et al [31], Hakim et al [33]
and Qasmi et al [34] in developing countries. Biosafety training
and proper use of PPE also help guard against LAIs [35]. The low
number of respondents and/or laboratories that reported con-
trolling pests, keeping health records, receiving vaccinations,
having occupational health and emergency response plans, having
a biosafety ofﬁcer(s), and achieving laboratory accreditation is a
concerning deviation from standard practices and recommenda-
tions of international biosafety organizations. Vaccination plays an
important role in limiting the incidence of infections with bio-
logical threat agents in occupationally exposed laboratory workers
[35]. As a point of comparison 36.5% of respondents from Nigerian
veterinary facilities reported receiving vaccinations while few
(10%; n ¼ 25) community health workers in Pakistan consistently
receive immunization against the infectious agents handled in
their laboratories [33]. Inadequate vaccination programs predis-
pose laboratory workers and researchers to acquiring LAIs. In
contrast to the developing world, research facilities in developed
countries such as the USA [32] not only have biosafety ofﬁcersBiosafety and Biosecurity in Veterinary Research Facilities in Nigeria,
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Table 6
Likelihood multivariate logistic regression analysis of occupation as a factor associated with the status of biosafety and biosecurity in veterinary research facilities in Nigeria
Availability and proper use of biosafety devices and PPE OR 95% CI p
Occupation
Low usage/availability (%) Good usage/availability (%)
Student 12 (16.2) 1 (1.4) 1.00
Academic 23 (31.1) 3 (4.1) 1.56 0.15, 16.71 > 0.999
Laboratory technologist 12 (16.2) 2 (2.7) 2.00 0.16, 25.11 > 0.999
Researcher 4 (5.4) 6 (8.1) 18.0 1.63, 198.5 0.023*
Veterinary clinician 10 (13.5) 1 (1.4) 1.20 0.07, 21.72 0.717
Management knowledge of biosafety
Occupation
Poor knowledge (%) Satisfactory knowledge (%)
Student 7 (9.5) 6 (8.1) 1.00
Academic 19 (25.7) 7 (9.5) 0.43 0.11, 1.73 0.399
Laboratory technologist 6 (8.1) 8 (10.8) 1.56 0.34, 7.11 0.853
Researcher 1 (1.2) 9 (12.2) 10.5 1.02, 108.6 0.075
Veterinary clinician 6 (8.1) 5 (6.8) 0.97 0.19, 4.87 > 0.999
Breakdown of laboratory biosecurity
Occupation
Had not occurred (%) Had occurred (%)
Student 11 (14.9) 2 (2.7) 1.00
Academic 20 (27.0) 6 (8.1) 1.65 0.28, 9.60 0.913
Laboratory technologist 12 (16.2) 2 (2.7) 0.92 0.11, 7.67 > 0.999
Researcher 8 (10.8) 2 (2.7) 1.38 0.16, 11.94 > 0.999
Veterinary clinician 4 (5.4) 11 (14.9) 15.13 2.28, 100.3 0.006*
Biosafety awareness
Occupation
Low (%) High (%)
Student 11 (14.9) 2 (2.7) 1.00
Academic 20 (27.0) 6 (8.1) 1.65 0.28, 9.60 0.621
Laboratory technologist 12 (16.2) 2 (2.7) 0.92 0.11, 7.67 > 0.999
Researcher 8 (10.8) 2 (2.7) 1.38 0.16, 11.94 > 0.999
Veterinary clinician 4 (5.4) 7 (9.5) 9.63 1.38, 67.24 0.043*
Attitude and adherence to standard laboratory practices
Occupation
Poor (%) Good (%)
Student 11 (14.9) 2 (2.7) 1.00
Academic 23 (31.1) 3 (4.1) 0.72 0.10, 4.93 > 0.999
Laboratory technologist 7 (9.5) 7 (9.5) 5.50 0.88, 34.46 0.075
Researcher 4 (5.4) 6 (8.1) 8.25 1.15, 59.00 0.073
Veterinary clinician 7 (9.5) 4 (5.4) 3.14 0.45, 21.96 0.479
* Signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
CI, conﬁdence interval; OR, odds ratio; PPE, personal protective equipment.
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in their laboratories.
Pathogens from all four risk groups, with some also having
select agent status, were studied by respondents to our survey.
Rabies virusda risk group 3 pathogendwas studied by the greatest
percentage of respondents. This is consistent with the ﬁndings of
Ng and Sargeant [4], who prioritized rabies highest and second
among zoonotic diseases in Canada and the USA, respectively in a
survey of health professionals. Other zoonotic pathogens studied by
respondents to our survey have been implicated as potential
occupational hazards and public health threats, including Brucella
spp. B. anthracis (the causative agent of anthrax), Salmonella spp.,
pathogenic Mycobacterium spp., Y. pestis and Histoplasma spp.
B. anthracis is an important pathogen causing LAI at high infective
doses but it can be prevented by personal protective measures and
adequate training in laboratory biosafety [35]. We found that re-
spondents to our survey worked with a diverse range of animal
species that included rodents, cattle, sheep and goats, dogs, cats,
ﬁsh, camels, pigs, rabbits, wildlife, and non-human primates.Please cite this article in press as: Odetokun IA, et al., Status of Laboratory
Safety and Health at Work (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shaw.2016.0Although the reported rate for breakdown of laboratory biosecurity
remains low, inadequate biosafety and biosecurity standards could
facilitate transmission of zoonoses from multiple animal species to
researchers and the public. Our results indicate that greater
attention should be paid to laboratory biosafety and biosecurity in
Nigeria, as at least seven major select agents (Brucella spp.,
B. anthracis, Clostridium spp., Lassa fever virus, M. mycoides, and
Y. pestis) are studied in Nigerian laboratories, despite the poor state
of laboratory biosafety.
The majority of the respondents to our survey described having
a poor attitude related to standard laboratory practices. Wearing
PPE was reported to be the most routinely used biosafety practice
in a survey of research laboratories in various parts of the world
[23]. Encouragingly, the majority of respondents in our study re-
ported routine use of PPE. Low compliance of laboratory workers
with the use of PPE and biosafety cabinets was found to be asso-
ciated with acquiring LAIs such as brucellosis [36]. Although a good
percentage (51, 68.9%) of researchers reported routinely decon-
taminating or removing PPE upon exit from their research facilities,Biosafety and Biosecurity in Veterinary Research Facilities in Nigeria,
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Table 7
Likelihood multivariate logistic regression analysis of biosafety level (BSL) as a factor associated with the status of biosafety and biosecurity in veterinary research facilities in
Nigeria
Availability and proper use of biosafety devices and PPE OR 95% CI p
BSL Low usage/Availability (%) Good usage/Availability (%)
None 47 (63.54) 0 (0.0) 1.000
1 10 (13.5) 0 (0.0) 4.700 0.09, 251.2 > 0.999
2 4 (5.4) 11 (14.9) 258.5 12.71, 5256 < 0.001*
3 0 (0.0) 2 (2.7) 376.0 5.83, 24270 0.006*
4 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 94.0 0.77, 11530 > 0.999
Management knowledge of biosafety
BSL Poor
knowledge (%)
Satisfactory
knowledge (%)
None 34 (46.0) 13 (17.6) 1.00
1 4 (5.4) 6 (8.1) 3.92 0.95, 16.19 0.115
2 1 (1.4) 14 (18.9) 36.62 4.37, 307.2 < 0.001*
3 0 (0.0) 2 (2.7) 10.46 0.44, 247.6 0.297
4 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 2.62 0.05, 138.8 > 0.999
Attitude and adherence to standard laboratory practices
BSL Poor (%) Good (%)
None 38 (51.4) 9 (12.2) 1.00
1 8 (10.8) 2 (2.7) 1.06 0.19, 5.84 > 0.999
2 6 (8.1) 9 (12.2) 6.33 1.79, 22.39 0.008*
3 0 (0.0) 2 (2.7) 16.89 0.70, 407.3 0.161
4 0 (0.0) 0 (0.0) 4.22 0.08, 227.4 > 0.999
* Signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
CI, conﬁdence interval; OR, odds ratio.
Table 8
Likelihood multivariate logistic regression analysis of facility type as a factor associated with the status of biosafety and biosecurity in veterinary research facilities in Nigeria
Availability and proper use of biosafety devices and PPE OR 95% CI p
Facility type Low usage/availability (%) Good usage/availability (%)
University/College laboratory 50 (67.6) 4 (5.4) 1.00
Research institute laboratory 4 (5.4) 8 (10.8) 25.0 5.18, 120.6 < 0.001*
Veterinary clinic laboratory 7 (9.5) 1 (1.4) 1.79 0.17, 18.35 > 0.999
Management knowledge of biosafety
Facility type Poor knowledge (%) Satisfactory knowledge (%)
University/College laboratory 32 (43.2) 22 (29.7) 1.00
Research institute laboratory 1 (1.4) 11 (14.7) 16.0 1.925, 133 0.003*
Veterinary clinic laboratory 6 (8.1) 2 (2.7) 0.48 0.09, 2.63 0.659
Attitude and adherence to standard laboratory practices
Facility type Poor (%) Good (%)
University/College laboratory 42 (56.8) 12 (16.2) 1.00
Research institute laboratory 4 (5.4) 8 (10.8) 7.00 1.79, 27.3 0.010*
Veterinary clinic laboratory 6 (8.1) 2 (2.7) 1.17 0.21, 6.54 > 0.999
* Signiﬁcant at p < 0.05.
CI, conﬁdence interval; OR, odds ratio; PPE, personal protective equipment.
Saf Health Work 2016;-:1e108far fewer (16, 21.6%) reported showering out of infectious areas in
the laboratory and decontaminating equipment before removal
from the research facility. There is also a lack of awareness on how
biohazardous waste generated in laboratories is transported for
disposal. The common practices of using dedicated vehicles and/or
vendors and wheelbarrows to transport biohazardous waste and
disposing of waste in general landﬁlls should be discouraged.
Instead, the less hazardous practice of incinerating biohazard wastePlease cite this article in press as: Odetokun IA, et al., Status of Laboratory
Safety and Health at Work (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shaw.2016.0should be encouraged. Our ﬁndings are comparable to results ob-
tained from a survey of the laboratories of 250 community health
workers in Pakistan [33], where 30% of laboratory researchers re-
ported use of PPE when carrying out microbiological work, 85.2%
reported washing hands during laboratory procedures, 32.2% of
laboratories reported having policies for the safe handling of
sharps, and 70% routinely decontaminated work surfaces and had
pest control programs.Biosafety and Biosecurity in Veterinary Research Facilities in Nigeria,
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ratory biosafety and biosecurity emphasized in international
agreements such as the Cartagena protocol [37], the situation in
Nigerian veterinary research facilities remains inadequate. The
poor awareness level of respondents concerning national and
global laws guiding biosafety, select agents, and other terms and
associations (NiBSA, AfBSA, IFBA, BMBL, IACUC, and IVBW) related
to biosafety and biosecurity point to a deﬁcit of laboratory biosafety
knowledge in Nigeria. Researchers in Nigerian veterinary facilities
were somewhat familiar with BMBL and IACUC because of the
nature of the pathogens studied and diverse animal species used as
models. A majority of the respondents (71.6%) were unaware of
national laws guiding biosafety and biosecurity in Nigeria. In 2015,
the Nigerian government passed a biosafety bill into law, yet the
majority of survey respondents remain unaware of this law. Even
with widespread unawareness, this law is inadequate as it only
addresses certiﬁcation of genetically modiﬁed organisms (GMO) in
food products for human health and in the environment, prohib-
iting the indiscriminate introduction of GMOs into circulation. No
provision in the new law was made for laboratory biosafety.
We cannot ascertain the status of laboratory biosafety in other
countries in the African continent (due to dearth of information)
but we speculate that the state (in most countries) is not too
different fromwhat is observed in Nigeria. Some countries such as
Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo, Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda,
Tanzania, and Uganda have biosafety regulations in place [38].
However, these laws/acts are mainly GMO focused and lacking in
the laboratory biosafety component. Most university research
laboratories in Africa are of BSL-1 while some research institutes
have BSL-2 and lower status BSL-3 (KEMRI 5 BSL-3) facilities. Few
specialized BSL-3 facilities are available; for example: Naval
Medical Research Unit No. 3, Cairo, Egypt; University of Nairobi/
University of Manitoba BSL-3 facility in Nairobi, Kenya; and the
National Veterinary Research Institute, Vom, Nigeria. Only two
BSL-4 facilities are in the continent: Centre International de
Recherches Médicales de Franceville, Franceville, Gabon; and the
National Institute for Communicable Diseases, Grahamstown,
South Africa.
The results of our multivariate logistic regression analysis
revealed that good knowledge of laboratory biosafety in Nigerian
veterinary facilities is more likely to be associated with male re-
searchers and those working in research institute laboratories. The
observation that male researchers demonstrated high knowledge
scores is expected as more male respondents (25/54) had received
training on laboratory biosafety than female respondents (6/20)
and also had (13/54) work experience greater than 10 years than
female researchers (2/20) that participated in the survey. Our re-
sults also show that respondents working in research institutes
demonstrate greater biosafety knowledge than those working in
other veterinary research facilities. Greater biosafety knowledge is
reﬂected in the observation that researchers and research institute
(facility type) are also predictive factors associated with adequacy
and proper usage of biosafety devices and PPE, a good attitude
towards biosafety, and adherence to standard laboratory practices.
The decreased likelihood of veterinary clinic laboratories experi-
encing a breakdown of biosafety or having a low awareness of
biosafety is expected. Limited research is being conducted in these
laboratories and biosafety principles are not typically maintained,
as few, if any, certiﬁcation bodies are available to accredit these
laboratories. We emphasize that research on highly infectious
pathogens should be restricted to laboratories with the experience
and capability to handle the agents [35].
Our study is not without limitations. We employed a conve-
nient sampling method, as only researchers in veterinary facilities
were interviewed, with the respondents identiﬁed using aPlease cite this article in press as: Odetokun IA, et al., Status of Laboratory
Safety and Health at Work (2016), http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.shaw.2016.0snowballing technique in which only interested researchers were
approached. We believe our sampling method does not affect the
external validity of our results as this approach is common in
observational studies. Another limitation is our inability to sample
up to the calculated size of 96. The size of 74 respondents we
sampled is reasonable because there are few veterinary research
laboratories in the country. Most veterinary research is limited to
laboratories present in veterinary schools (there are fewer than 10
universities in Nigeria with accredited veterinary faculties) and
the National Veterinary Research Institute. Also, responses from
the remaining 22 might not have affected observed responses
signiﬁcantly. The geographic distribution of respondents was ex-
pected and is reﬂective of the distribution of researchers in the
few available veterinary research facilities across Nigeria. In
addition, the information provided by the respondents cannot be
conﬁrmed, potentially affecting our outcome variables and intro-
ducing bias. This risk was mitigated by asking certain questions in
different ways to conﬁrm earlier answers and eliminate
inconsistencies.
This study revealed that current knowledge of laboratory
biosafety and biosecurity in Nigerian veterinary research facilities
is limited except among a very few researchers. There is inade-
quate availability of and access to biosafety devices and PPE, as
well as a low awareness level by researchers regarding national
and international laws and associations pertaining to laboratory
biosafety. Due to the recent outbreaks of highly infectious agents
in West Africa (Nigeria inclusive), Nigeria should be at the fore-
front of carrying out risk assessments. A national reporting system
for LAIs and a National Biosafety and Biosecurity Strategic Plan (in
terms of situation alerts, emergency preparedness, and response)
should be developed. There should also be a national classiﬁcation
of microorganisms by risk group (deﬁned by pathogenicity, mode
of transmission/host range, and local availability of effective pre-
ventive and treatment measures). Current laws on biosafety
should be redressed to include a laboratory biosafety component
and should conform to guidelines and policies existing in inter-
national biosafety manuals. We advocate the provision of
biosafety devices in veterinary research laboratories across
Nigeria, with greater attention focused on training and re-training
of research scientists in biosafety and biosecurity. There is a need
for continuous investment in research infrastructure into which
biosafety facilities are well incorporated. We are also calling for
the development, promotion, and maintenance of a laboratory
biosafety and biosecurity culture through the education of re-
searchers, laboratory technologists, veterinary practitioners, and
other stakeholders. The NiBSA should be fortiﬁed to effectively
champion the cause of advancing biosafety and biosecurity across
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